

**SECRET***Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Assistant Director, Reports and Estimates

DATE: 13 December 1949

FROM : Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT: Comments on the staff study, A Concept of National Intelligence Production on the Far East, 1 December 1949

REFERENCE: EPB Notice No. 2-49, 9 December 1949

1. Reference memo indicates that comments should be prepared on the intelligence aspects of subject paper. I do not consider myself competent to comment on the adequacy of this paper as an intelligence plan for the specific area for which it is written. I have, however, two comments which may be pertinent if what I assume to have been D/FE's basic procedure were to be applied to other areas.

a. The question should be considered whether an objective as broad as the framing of intelligence requirements for an area (that is, for any area except the Soviet sphere itself) should be limited by an assumption admitting the controlling influence of the US-USSR struggle. It might be better to start with the area itself and look first for all area factors of general importance to the US before assuming a point of view dictated by a particular, possibly not permanent, situation in which the US finds itself. In that case, it would be preferable that the present dominance of the US-USSR struggle over the intelligence picture enter at the stage of determining priorities rather than that it control a requirement list.

b. This second comment, while not exclusively on material under Tab A, seems pertinent in that it refers to the apparent results of Tab A in producing Tab B. The conclusions of the staff study seem to have produced a list of requirements heavily weighted on the side of basic research, with insufficient allowance for the necessity of dealing with current situations. One may assume that the projected studies are, since they have found a place in a list to which so much thought has been given, necessary to a proper understanding of the area involved. It seems, however, no disparagement of their intrinsic value to suggest that they are to some extent preliminary to, rather than examples of, the intelligence reporting that should furnish support for national policy.

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R.D.G.